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Abstract
Prefunding of pension commitments in OECD economies is increasingly
seen as a central strategy to cope with the aging of their populations.  This
paper argues that investments in emerging markets can help at the margin
but are unable to solve the demographic problem.  While these
investments bring potential advantages through enhanced risk diversi-
fication, higher rates of return, and accelerated financial market
development, the total effects are likely to be limited.  Furthermore, in
order to harvest them, capital sending and receiving countries must fulfill
various politically and economically challenging requirements.  For
pension policy, the limited contribution of pre-funding at home and abroad
in order to address the demographic problem implies that enhanced
emphasis must be given to domestic reforms.
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Prefunding of pension commitments in OECD economies is increasingly seen as a
central strategy to cope with the aging of their populations.  All OECD countries run
their public pension schemes essentially on an unfunded basis, and population aging
and a deterioration in the contributor/beneficiary ratio are bound to further increase
the often high pension expenditure as a percent of GDP unless benefits are curtailed
and retirement age is increased (see Annex Table A.1).  Some countries started to
respond by accumulating a reserve fund for their PAYG scheme – most prominently
the US and Norway – and all envisage reduced public generosity of the unfunded
schemes plus enhanced mandated or voluntary individual retirement savings as a
means to cope with population aging in general and the retirement of the babyboom
generation in particular (OECD, 1998).  Progress among the high-income OECD
countries in their reform efforts has been uneven, as witnessed by the different size in
implicit pension debts (the accrued-to-date liabilities for current retirees and workers;
see Palacios and Pallares-Miralles, 2000; Annex Table A.2) and the situation of
generational accounts (an increasingly prominent indicator for the intertemporal
imbalance in government accounts, see Kotlikoff and Raffelhueschen, 1999;
Auerbach et al., 1999; Annex Table A.3).  In consequence, the need for, and size of
the effects from funding will be different among the countries and has to be seen in
perspective.
While prefunding helps to ease the aging problem, it does not solve it.  Unfunded as
well as funded schemes need future generations to complete the intergenerational
contract by paying contributions in PAYG or buying assets from the elderly in funded
schemes.  Since all OECD economies are confronted with much the same aging
process, there are limited gains from mutual investments.  In contrast, aging in
developing countries is occurring with delay and in a differentiated manner.  This has
created expectations that investments in emerging markets may be a vehicle to
circumvent or at least substantially ease the pension problem in highly developed,
aging societies while at the same time providing developing countries with additional
funds to accelerate their catch-up growth.
1  The alternatives are lower benefits, higher
contributions or increased retirement age (or a combination of these changes) or
enhanced migration from developing countries to compensate for the demographic
gap.
This paper argues that investments in emerging markets help at the margin, but do not
solve the demographic problem.  In order to harvest the potential advantages, capital
sending and receiving countries must fulfill various politically and economically
challenging requirements.  Yet since these conditions are anyhow necessary to make
the world benefit from globablization, there are good reasons to pursue them.  For
pension policy, the limited contribution of pre-funding at home and abroad in order to
address the demographic problem implies that enhanced emphasis must be given to
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improving labor market conditions for the elderly and reducing incentives for early
retirement.  Furthermore, broad-ranging policies need to be implemented so that
future, older generations are not unduly burdened with explicit public debt and a
deteriorated environment.
The paper is structured in four sections.  Section 2 highlights the principal
demographic characteristics of aging in developing and developed economies.
Section 3 outlines the main potential advantages of investments abroad.  Section 4
sketches the requirements for such a policy to be effective and useful supporting
policies for its implementation, while Section 5 concludes.
2.  Demographic Background
The aging of populations is one of the key motivations for the call to prefund pension
commitments (World Bank, 1994).  Other arguments in support of funded schemes
include lower distortions on factor markets and lower political risks, or higher
credibility of the reform process (Holzmann, 2000).
To assess the claim that prefunding – at home and/or abroad – can ease or solve the
demographic shift, a number of demographic trends have to be kept in mind:
(i) Two different aspects of demographic change, and their consequences for pension
financing, need to be distinguished:  a massive increase in residual life expectancy at
age 60 or 65, and a rapid decline in reproduction rates.
To cope with an increase in life expectancy at retirement for a given replacement rate
requires an increase in the contribution rate, independent of its financing method –
funding or PAYG.  The scope of the required rate increase may be lower if part of the
prefunding happens in emerging economies with a slower aging process.  Independent
of the financing method, the policy recommendation for dealing with this
phenomenon is simple:  raise the retirement age so as to leave the relative length of
retirement period in adult life constant, or cut pension benefits in reverse proportion.
Either method assures that the relative positions of the respective generations (their
discounted net payments into or receipts from the pension system) remain unaltered
when compared with the situation before the demographic change.
A decline in fertility – holding constant the long-run paths of rates of return on capital
and productivity growth – unilaterally decreases the rate of return of the unfunded
systems.  This has two main consequences:  it raises questions of intergenerational
redistribution in unfunded schemes, which cannot be easily addressed, and it changes
the relative rates of return of unfunded vs. funded schemes, making the latter more
attractive.
(ii)  Chart 1 and 2 of past and projected life expectancy and fertility rates clearly
indicate that in all regions of the world both forces of aging are at work.  However,
the scope and timing differ among regions.
Since the early 80s the fertility rate in high income OECD countries has been below
reproduction level (around 2.1); the same is valid since the early 90s for the ECA
countries.  All other regions exhibit a strong decline in the fertility rate toward repro-5
duction level – the convenient but not necessarily realistic benchmark of demographic
projections.
Chart 1: Past and projected total fertility by region, 1970-2040
Source: Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000)
The life expectancy at birth (and at retirement age) has also been increasing in a more
or less continuous manner in all regions.  High income OECD countries exhibit the
highest life expectancies but smallest absolute or relative changes.  For the other
regions the reverse largely holds:  the lower the initial level, the larger the
improvement.  This development indicates a dynamic benchmark character of the
high-income OECD countries towards which all other regions converge (unless
reversed by AIDS in some regions).
Chart 2: Past and projected life expectancy by region, 1970-2040
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 (iii)  These common trends in fertility and life expectancy lead to a common aging
situation, if aging is defined as an increase in the average age of the population.
However, if “population aging” is defined as a transition from a high to low support
ratio (population aged 15-60 to population 60+), then the population falls into two
groups.  In the first, consisting of the high-income OECD populations in Europe,
North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the support ratio is declining from
an already low base (the Fast Aging Countries: FACs).  In the second group (the Slow
Aging Countries: SACs), consisting of populations in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
the support ratio is also declining, but it will not reach levels currently seen in the first
group of countries until the middle of next century.  This relates to other salient
features important for future economic interdependence (Charts 3 and 4).
Chart 3:  Annual Growth Rate of Labor Force (15-60 years), 1955-2050
OECD and Low- and Middle-Income Country Groups
Source:  calculations on data from the United Nations, The Sex and Age Distribution of the
World Populations, 1998 Revision
The demographic prospects imply divergent trends in labor force growth in the two
regions.  FAC populations will age from the middle of the age pyramid as the large
baby-boom cohort retires around 2010.  SAC populations will age from the bottom, as
today’s young persons move into the working years, and they will be replaced by
much smaller age cohorts as a result of the rapid recent fertility decline.  Assuming
fixed age- and sex-specific labor force participation rates, labor force growth rates
will rapidly decline in the FAC area and turn negative after 2010.
2  In contrast, age
distribution changes will lead to a growing labor force in the SAC area, and the share
of the working-age population will remain roughly constant despite rapid increases in
the elderly population.
The change in the age distribution will shift the balance between primary savers and
borrowers in the population, with consequences for the rate of net financial asset
accumulation and the rate of return on financial assets.  As the baby boom generation
                                                                
2 Scenario projections for the European Union claim that increases in the female labor force participation rates toward that of men
and in the retirement age can largely compensate for aging in their effects on the support ratio, and hence on pension financing

































Low- and Middle-Income Countries7
moves through the peak asset accumulation years, the share of primary savers in the
adult population (age group 40-59 to population aged 15+) will rise until roughly
2010 in FAC and then start to decline.  In SACs this ratio rises from a much lower
level and will not stop to increase before the end of the projection period.
Chart 4:  Primary Savers Ratio (age group 15-60 years to 15-60), 1950-2050
OECD and Low- and Middle-Income Country Groups
Source:  calculations on data from the United Nations, The Sex and Age Distribution of the
World Populations, 1998 Revision
3.  Main Potential Advantages
Against these demographic shifts and differences in the aging process between FACs
and SACs, what are the advantages of investing abroad, and can these investments
solve the aging problem?  This section argues that there are three main advantages to
investing in emerging markets – better risk diversification, rate of return increase and
improved economic environment –, all of which should ease the aging problem but
are unlikely to solve it.  To capture these potential advantages demands, of course,
meeting critical requirements for macroeconomic management, security of repayment,
and financial market development, discussed in section 4.
(i)  Enhanced risk diversification without net-capital flows can and should be
undertaken independently of aging and differences between the regions.  In this case
the gross flows of capital between developed and developing countries would balance,
but the cross-holding of assets would improve the risk-return profile for both.
Modern portfolio theory and its major tool, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM),
hold that the world market portfolio is the optimal portfolio in a fully efficient and
integrated capital market.  For any portfolio under-invested in foreign assets (as a
percentage of world market capitalization), there is the prospect of a free lunch:
international diversification does lower the risk by eliminating nonsystemic volatility
without sacrificing return.  Alternatively, globalization will raise the expected return
for a given risk level.  The diversification benefits consist of reduced risk, usually




























Low- and Middle-Income Countries8
investment in markets that are relatively uncorrelated, or even better, negatively
correlated with the domestic market.  International diversification reduces risk better
than domestic diversification because securities exhibit stronger correlation as a result
of their joint exposure to country-specific shocks (Reisen, 2000).
If the implications of the CAPM were to largely hold, the implications for FACs
would be substantial even if no net-capital flows were to take place.  A major
reservation against funded pensions in the form of personal pensions is the volatility
of capital market returns (shares and bonds).  Simulations with historic US data from
1871 to 1995 indicate that domestic diversification among stocks and bonds and
alternative disbursement/annutization procedures succeeded in reducing the ratio of
the maximum and minimum replacement rate for individuals from almost 5 to around
2.5 (Alier and Vittas, 2000).  Yet, many of the strategies do not only lead to a lower
max/min ratio but also to higher probability of a low absolute replacement rate – a
political difficult outcome both with regard to convincing large parts of the population
to move more forcefully toward funded personal pensions, and ex post since it is
likely to imply major government responsibility to secure a minimum replacement
rate/rate of return.  Option price estimates in the European context put the costs low if
the guaranteed floor under the compound rate of return is 0%.  However, as the level
of floor rises to 3% p.a., the put option becomes as expensive as 30% of the value of
the original investment (Miles and Timmermann, 1999).
There are no estimates (yet) available what benefits a FAC-wide, and further on, a
world-wide diversification would provide with regard to the max/min replacement
rate ratio.  Scenario calculations for Germany, Japan, the UK and US suggest that
international diversification among these highly developed economies helps to reduce
the volatility of return, but not too much since their financial market returns (stocks
and bonds) are mostly correlated in the range of 0.2 to 0.6.  More reduction in
volatility of the rate of return – with limited reduction in the return level – can be
achieved through a multi-pillar structure of unfunded and funded pensions that
includes the rate of return of unfunded schemes – the growth of wages (Holzmann,
2000; Annex Table A.4).
The benefits of global diversification, however, may look different from FACs’ and
SACs’ perspectives, depending on the starting condition of the domestic return/risk
trade-off, and this is not independent from the period under consideration (Table 3).
3
From the OECD perspective in the mid-1990s, it looked like diversification into
emerging markets would allow investors to benefit simultaneously by raising the
mean returns and reducing the overall portfolio risks.  Then, returns and risk were
lower in OECD than in various countries in Latin America and East Asia, which
exhibited much higher return and risk, leading to major capital flows to emerging
markets.  For the SAC investor, it looked like (s)he would have had to buy lower
overall risk by lowering the mean portfolio return through diversification into the
global portfolio.
4  This has resulted in a reluctance of pension funds in Chile or
                                                                
3 Table 3 serves for illustration. It is well understood that means and standard deviations estimated for a period of 24 months have
a large sample error. .  Calculations over a somewhat longer time period indicate that US pension funds would have gained little
in diversifying internationally, but pension funds in Latin America could have substantially improved their risk/return profile if
they had invested a main share (or even all) of their assets in the US (see Srinivas and Yermo, 2000).
4 This appearance is, of course, misleading.  Investors could have still maintained the same return and reduced the country risk by
other means even before the crisis: (i) investing in negatively correlated markets but with high risk/return profiles (including
other emerging markets); (ii) investing in risker assets in the countries which themselves have lower country risk (e.g., buying
lower graded bonds); (iii) using leverage (margin buying) to increase the risk/return to lower risk equities.9
provident funds in Malaysia to diversify globally.  Five years later, and after the
financial crisis in East Asia, Russia and part of Latin America, the situation seems
reversed.  Pension funds in Chile or Singapore have increased their share of foreign
investments substantially, but the continued stock market rally in North America and
Europe created a reluctance of OECD investors to buy risk reduction through lower
returns in emerging markets.  For the latter this may prove to be an expensive decision
once the reversion towards the mean takes place.  Hence, the realization of the
potential benefits of international diversification seems to depend on the behavior of
(institutional) investors, and their incentive structures may be at odds with CAPM.










(Jan. 1993 – Dec. 1996)
Latin America
. Argentina 20.3 32.2 1.59 0.44
. Chile 16.1 25.3 1.57 0.22
. Mexico 1.4 37.7 27.05 0.20
East Asia
. Korea -2.2 22.7 -10.4 0.01
. Philippines 26.1 29.3 1.12 0.18
. Thailand 8.1 33.1 4.08 0.32
IFCG Latin America 14.2 24.7 1.73 0.24
IFCG Asia 12.9 19.7 1.52 0.23
US, S&P 500 16.4 9.0 0.54 1.00
(Jan. 1997 – Dec. 1998)
Latin America
. Argentina 1.2 36.4 29.95 0.78
. Chile -7.2 33.0 -4.55 0.69
. Mexico 5.7 40.1 6.99 0.80
East Asia
. Korea 11.0 82.3 7.45 0.26
. Philippines -28.2 56.2 -1.99 0.58
. Thailand -37.2 74.2 -1.99 0.54
IFCG Latin America -2.0 36.7 -18.25 0.80
IFCG Asia -25.8 31.5 -1.22 0.66
US, S&P 500 29.0 18.5 0.63 1.00
Source:  Calculations from data in IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1999.
(ii)  Net capital flows to emerging economies should enhance the benefits of invest-
ments for FACs beyond risk diversification.  Without capital flows – equivalent to a
closed economy setting when abstracting from risk – the neoclassic response to
slowing labor force productivity or growth is to substitute capital for labor, leading to
an increase in the capital-output ratio and a corresponding reduction in the rate of
return to capital.
5  Pari passu, the rate of return to saving declines, leading households
to consume rather than save so that the economies’ reduced demand for investment is
matched by reduced supply of savings.  In long-run equilibrium, the result of aging –
                                                                
5 Introducing other factors of production, notably human capital (skills and knowledge), may alter the conclusions somewhat.
Yet population aging may also negatively impact the growth of human capital formation with negative effects on returns to
capital, but the direction and size of such effects remain undetermined for the time being.10
independent of changes in the rate of growth of total population – is reduced per
capita output and consumption.
The potential impact of a closed economy setting can be highlighted by out-of-sample
forecasts in the US context based on an econometric exercise that explains the S&P
price/earnings ratio with a standard stock market valuation model, with P/E
determined by the prime saving/desaving ratio (population aged 40-60 to 60+), the
(inverse of the) Federal discount rate and the annual change in average hourly wages
(Reisen, 2000).
6  Keeping the last two constant makes the projected price/earning
ratio only dependent on the demographic variable, suggesting a peak very soon of
around 20 before starting a long decline to about 14 at around 2030 (Chart 5).  While
this is all highly speculative, it confirms earlier concerns (Schieber and Shoven, 1994)
that asset prices will become negatively effected as US pension funds cease to be a
source of net savings once the baby boom generation starts to retire.
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Under an open economy setting, FACs can profit from differences in labor force
development and capital-output ratios in SAC, which are in general much less
developed.  A number of studies (e.g., Cutler et al., 1990; Boersch-Suppan, 1996;
Yoo, 1994; Higgins, 1997) have concluded that demographic divergence should
stimulate net-capital flows from the most rapidly aging regions (especially Europe and
Japan) to less rapidly aging regions (the less developed economies) where the capital-
output ratio is lower and the rate of return to capital is higher.  With a significant
portion of FAC savings being invested in SACs, capital returns and saving rates as
well as per capita output would be higher in the FACs vis á vis the autarchy case.
                                                                
6 Underlying econometric estimates for Chart 5:
Dependent variable Explanatory variables





Change of hourly wages
Coefficient       0.09***     46.1***   ￿1.5***




2: 0.88 Durbin-Watson: 1.98
Period: 1977–96 *** = significant at the
0.01 level
Source: Reisen (2000)11
However, more recent macroeconomic simulations come to the conclusion that while
such beneficial effects of net capital flows may exist, they are likely to be rather small
(OECD, 1998; MacKellar and Reisen, 1998; MacKellar et al., 1999).
7  Based on a
neoclassic two-factor multi-regional economic-demographic model, MacKellar et al.
(1999) simulate two scenarios for the period 1995 to 2100:  an autarchy scenario that
holds current capital flow share coefficients essentially constant, and a globalization
scenario that allows the capital flow share coefficients to rise in line with the growing
share of SACs in global stock market capitalization and GDP.  While under the
autarchy scenario net-capital flows remain below 1 percent of FACs’ GDP and
eventually become negative, under the globalization scenario the net-capital flow
becomes up to 3 percent of GDP higher, and while decreasing toward the end of the
simulation period, it never becomes negative.  The starting value in both scenarios is
0.4 percent.  This net capital flow translates under the globalization scenario into an
increase of net-foreign assets for FACs from 3 percent of GDP (1995) to 90 percent
(2050) before again declining.  For SACs, their negative net foreign asset position of
13 percent of GDP deteriorates to over 106 percent of GDP (2030) before gradually
improving.
Yet, these huge net-capital flows and main changes in the net asset positions in FACs
and SACs have limited effects on FACs.  While the effects are reversed in SACs, the
impact is stronger because the change in the capital-output ratio caused by
globalization is greater.  Comparing the results of the globalization with the autarchy
scenario suggests:
•  Global GDP is increased as a result of global efficiency gains from the
reallocation of capital by over 1 percent, and that of FACs (SACs) is reduced
(increased) due to less (more) capital available in the respective region.
•  The lower capital in FACs translates into substantially lower wages (up to over
minus 4 percent) but higher rates of return to capital (up to plus 60 basis points).
The situation is reversed in SACs with interest rates some 200 basis points lower
but wages up to 8 percent higher.
•  The saving rate impacts are marginal and ambiguous.  Total saving (in percent of
regional GDP) tends to be somewhat higher in FACs under the globalization
scenario, but lower in SACs.
•  The adjusted disposable income per capita for the working age and the elderly
populations is up to 1 percent lower.
•  When dissaving of assets is added to the disposable income, total resources
available for financing consumption of the population aged over 60 is virtually the
same under the two scenarios during much of the simulation period.
•  The lower retirement income in SACs reflects the lower interest rate insufficiently
compensated by higher wages and later higher unfunded pensions (Table 2).
                                                                
7 These macroeconomic calculations do not consider that population aging is likely to induce holdings of less risky portfolios.  In
open economies, it would imply less weight to riskier emerging market securities.  In a closed economy, the result would be
portfolios weighted toward bonds, and hence a decline in the long-term interest rate.12
Table 2:  Summary of MacKellar et al. (1999) Simulations Results
                                                                                    1995    2020    2050    2100
Net capital flows, FACs to SACs (% of FAC GDP)
Autarchy scenario  0.4 1.05 0.72  -0.18
Globalization scenario   0.4 2.89 3.74 +1.65
Difference 1.83 3.02 +1.82
Net foreign assets, Scenario differences (in % GDP)
FACs  20.2  63.4   71.2
SACs -46.4 -64.3  -34.5
GDP (1995$), Scenario differences
Global GDP  0.53   1.27   1.04
FACs -1.64  -4.20  -3.31
SACs +6.25 +7.75 +3.30
Rate of return on capital, FACs %
Autarchy scenario 10.3   8.7    8.0    7.8
Globalization scenario 10.3   9.0    8.6    8.4
Difference   0.3    0.4    0.6
Average wage, Scenario differences
FACs -1.6  - 4.2   -3.3
SACs +6.3  +7.8  +3.3
Income at retirement, Scenario differences
FACs  0.13   0.40  2.56
      SACs                                                                                 -0.80    -0.92    -.148
(iii)  These sobering, small effects of large capital flows towards emerging markets
have, of course, to be seen in perspective.  They result from a neoclassic model, and
the main driving force is differences in capital stocks in FACs and SACs under the
alternative scenarios.  Hence, any other effects from enhanced net-capital flows as a
result of strengthened prefunding of pension liabilities does not enter.  Among the
latter, the purging literature notes three main effects:  fostering financial market
development, enhancing corporate governance, and greater openness that goes in
hand with stronger capital flows.  All these effects are likely to have a stronger
impact on SACs, but they are conjectured to be important for many FACs as well:
•  The importance of financial market developments for economic growth has been
rediscovered in the 1990s – either as an instrument to accelerate the catch-up
growth/economic convergence under a neoclassic setting or as an explanation for
endogenous economic growth (Levine, 1997).  A main ingredient to financial
market development may come from funded pensions under decentralized and
privatized fund management, and the Chilean experience of high economic growth
and financial market development lends some empirical evidence to this
hypothesis (Holzmann, 1997; Schmidt-Hebbel, 1998).  Similar effects may also
emerge in FACs with personal and funded pensions when moving from a bank-
based to a financial market-based intermediation.13
•  A main reason for the improvement in productivity when strengthening funded
pension provision may emerge from improved corporate governance.  Traditional
capital ownership structures in Germany (and many other European countries) is
increasingly claimed to be diluted by cross holdings of banks and non-financial
companies and quite different from the pattern of ownership in countries in which
pension funds manage a major share of the capital.  This difference in the
governance structure is held responsible for lower productive growth at company
and macroeconomic level in Germany and is also claimed to be visible at the
cross-country level (Börsch-Suppan and Winter, 1999).
•  Last but not least, increased net capital flows are linked with greater openness of
an economy on the export and import sides, and there are many arguments for the
link between outward orientation and economic growth, supported by endogenous
growth consideration and rising empirical evidence (e.g., Grossman and Helpman,
1992; Frenkel and Romer, 1999):  (i) the export-import sector serves as a vehicle
of technology transfer through the importation of advanced capital goods and as a
channel for positive intersectoral externalities through the development of
efficient and competitive management, training of skilled workers, and the
spillover consequences of scale expansion; (ii) closer economic links increase the
transmission of technology, thereby reducing the duplication of research and
development activities – because knowledge is a public good, its accumulation
increases the rate of technical progress; and, (iii) the opening of trade reduces
price distortions, reallocating resources across sectors and increasing economic
efficiency.
All these and other effects of enhanced net-capital flows resulting from prefunding
pensions are likely to have large positive economic effects in the sending and
receiving countries.  Although their potential magnitude can currently not even be
guessed, one would have to be very brave to assume that the effects would be large
enough to solve the aging problem in industrialized countries.
4.  Critical Requirements and Supporting Policies
To fully profit from the potential effects of prefunding and increased net-capital flows
in FACs and SACs alike, various requirements need to be met, most importantly with
regards to appropriate macroeconomic policies.  In addition, there are various
supporting policies that, while not necessary to achieve the positive effects, are likely
to enhance the outcome.  This sections sketches out the main relevant arguments in
turn.
At the macroeconomic level, additional net capital flows require additional saving
efforts that translate into an increased current account surplus in FACs.  Corres-
pondingly in the receiving SACs the additional resources must be translated into
higher capital accumulation (and not only higher consumption) to generate an
enhanced output base from which interests and future capital repatriation are paid.
These represent no small challenges for both sending and receiving countries.
Enhanced prefunding of pensions in FACs does not automatically translate into higher
domestic saving.  If pension saving inflates asset prices, illusionary wealth effects
may even reduce individual saving efforts and the household saving rate (as percent of
GDP).  Furthermore, moving from unfunded to funded pensions through debt14
financing is also not conducive to enhance domestic saving.  While the avenues of
how to enhance private savings (from households and enterprises) are complex and
uncertain, enhanced public saving through lower public deficits or even surpluses
seems to be more certain.  International evidence suggests private sector dessaving
compensates some 50 percent of public saving effort.  Hence, if private saving were to
change little, also because the negative wealth effect of outflows on asset prices and a
depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to little more saving, the public sector
would have to double the target net-capital flows.  Assuming the latter in the range of
3 percent of GDP (in line with the globalization scenario reported above), the fiscal
stance would have to change by some 6 percent of GDP, a rather unrealistic number
that, furthermore, would also be inconsistent with targeted household ownership of
pension assets.  Yet, how to increase the private saving rate through public actions
remains largely unknown.
On the receiving side, the SACs need to make sure that the additional capital inflows
translate into enhanced capital accumulation and not (only) into higher consumption.
If this does not take place, the output base will not increase accordingly to service the
debt with ease or at all.  Quite likely, the outflow from FACs to those SACs would
stop once the investors perceive the unsustainable macroeconomic position of a
country.  In the past, such a position was mostly linked with an enlarged fiscal
stance/public dissaving fueled by enhanced capital inflows.  More recently it is often
the private sector in SACs/developing economies that accrues unsustainable foreign
debt positions not matched by profitable investments, as witnessed by the recent
financial crisis in East Asia.  This has led to questions about an increased
macroeconomic vulnerability of developing economies in face of rising capital flows,
and the evidence of capital controls to contain these effects seems to be mixed
(Ariyoshi et al., 2000).  Furthermore, even sustained capital inflows can be a mixed
blessing and typically create a policy dilemma between external competitiveness and
inflation, challenging fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy simultaneously (see
Gacs et al., 1999).
Security of repayment is another important issue.  Any borrower likes the loan but
not its repayment.  Countries are not different, in particular if the economic base for
debt service is weak and the generation of a current account surplus can only happen
at reduced consumption in order to generate the needed surplus savings.  Pressed by a
local constituency, politicians may thus decide to declare bankruptcy or simply to
refuse to repay the amount fully or on time.  With SACs’ rising share in the world
population, output and military power, their negotiation stance with FACs will rise,
rendering such scenarios more likely.  While globalization can be thought to increase
the costs of short-term opportunistic behavior by individual countries, this may be
more than compensated by a coalition of delinquent debtors.  What are the possible
security arrangements against economic and political default, and what is the role of
current and new international organizations?  While these questions cannot be easily
answered, it appears that without a convincing security structure it will be difficult to
convince the working generation in FACs to agree to hold a large share of their
retirement assets in emerging markets.
Major and sustained capital flows by pension funds from FACs are likely to require
reasonably developed financial markets in the receiving country that are
sufficiently deep and liquid, well regulated and supervised.  Otherwise the absorptive15
capacity will be limited and mere price effects will dominate, the possibility for short
term changes in the portfolio will be limited and costly, and simply the confidence by
the outside investor will be low.  Despite significant improvements in the 1990s, very
few emerging markets currently fulfil the criteria of a sufficiently developed financial
market, and as the experience shows, their fulfillment is protracted and tedious.  A
shortcut to this goal may be pension reform in emerging markets themselves and the
introduction of personal and funded pensions managed by competitive and private
pension funds (Vittas, 1999).  OECD experience suggests that contractual savings
through pension funds and insurance companies is closely linked to enhanced market
capitalization and liquidity (Musalem and Catalan, 1999).  The more limited
experience in emerging markets also suggests that pension funds can make an
important contribution to financial market development, and the examples certainly
include Chile (Holzmann, 1997), and perhaps Argentina, Hungary and Poland.
While emerging markets generally welcome inflows from pension funds and other
foreign investors, they are usually reluctant to grant their pension funds the right to
invest abroad.  Even if they do, emerging markets seem to share with developed
markets the home bias of pension funds (and other institutional investors), understood
as a much lower share compared to what standard models of global portfolio choice
would suggest (Table 3).
Table 3:  The Home-Asset Preference in Funded Pension Assets
1990 1995(c)
Total Pension Assets, bn $
OECD 4.813 7.865
Non-OECD    109    311
Home-Asset Share, % of Assets (a)
OECD Pension Assets   92.8   88.9
Non-OECD Pension Assets (b) 100.0   99.3
Notes:  (a) Home assets shares refers only to the share of assets invested in the home country of the
investor.
(b) Excludes Hong Kong where the foreign asset share is 60 percent.
(c) Estimate.
Source:  InterSec Research Company
The reluctance of the authorities to permit outside investment reflects the often low
domestic saving in the country and the assessment that the outflows will not
compensated by corresponding inflows, leaving the country with a lower base of
resources to be invested.  More sophisticated explanations point to a higher social
value of domestic compared to foreign investment by emerging markets.  Independent
of these economic justifications, limitations on foreign investments by SACs reduces
the diversification of the investment risks in SACs and FACs alike.  To overcome
these restrictions on (net-) capital flows, the enhanced use of  swap operations
between pension funds and other institutional investors of emerging and developed
markets has been proposed.  Such swaps exist between pension funds of developed
markets, but the only known example for emerging markets is South Africa in the
1990s.  Another approach would consist in the use of futures and options, with a
moderate net capital flow resulting from margin requirements.16
What are the limitations and how can the use of swaps be enhanced?  As limitations
one could conjecture issues of a thin market with problems such as market-
information, pricing, timing, and slicing (across an index) and the need for a market
maker.  Is there a role for international financial market institutions such as the
World Bank and regional development banks to act as an honest broker/market
creating institution jointly with the private sector in developed and emerging markets?
In the same regard, there seems to be an advantage for enhanced coordination
between foreign and domestic investors that push for new products, better standards
and more transparency.  Will competitive markets establish such interactions or does
this need the intermediation of an international organization?
5.  Conclusion
The saving surplus created by the baby-boom generation in OECD economies and the
capital need of less developed economies have created the hope that investments in
emerging markets can help to solve the aging problem.  Theoretical considerations
and limited empirical evidence suggest that potential benefits for enhanced capital
flows do exist, but that they are likely to be to modest and, furthermore, require
significant policy actions by sending countries, receiving countries, and, perhaps,
current or new international organizations.
Potential benefits of investments have been identified at the level of enhanced
portfolio diversification without net-capital flows and market strengthening effects,
such as accelerated financial market development, enhanced corporate governance
and increased economic openness.  The effects of net-capital flows toward emerging
markets seem to be important for them since they greatly increase the capital-output
ratio, but they are less important for the developed economies, at least in a neoclassic
setting.
To harvest the limited effects of enhanced capital flows, however, requires policy
actions in sending and receiving countries.  For the developed markets, it demands an
increase in the saving rate that may not necessarily emerge when moving from
unfunded to funded pensions; this is likely to require a strengthened fiscal stance (i.e.,
public saving).  The emerging markets have to make sure that the received money is
translated into higher capital accumulation and not (only) higher consumption.
Otherwise, the flows will eventually dry-up and the resources for debt service will not
be easily available.
Last but not least, there are various supporting policies to maximize the effects, and
they include financial market development in emerging markets, which may be
accelerated by their move toward funded and privately managed pensions, and
increased interactions between domestic and foreign institutional investors, which
may need the facilitation of current or new international financial institutions.
These sobering results imply that the solution to the aging problem has to be found
largely in the countries themselves, through a reformed pension system that is less
distortionary for individual labor supply and saving decisions, a lengthening of
working life in line with increased life expectancy and corresponding incentives for
lifelong learning and changes in the labor market, and policies that do not pass an
undue burden to the future, and on average much older, generations, in the form of
public debt and a deteriorated environment.17
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Table A.1:  Public pension spending as percentage of GDP
High-income OECD countries
Source: OECD (1998)
Table A.2: Estimates of Implicit Debt in Hifh-income OECD Countries
Source: Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000)
Table A.3: International Comparisons of Generational Accounting
Alternative Ways to Achieve Generational Balance
Pension























United Kingdom 1995 10.2
United States 1995 7.2
OECD (1994)  OECD (1996)  IMF (1996) Kune (1996) IMF (1995) Kune (1996) General Govmt.
Projected Projected Projected Projected* Accrued Accrued Gross Debt**
Base Year 1990 1994 1995 1990 1995 1990 1994
Country
Percent of GDP
Austria  -- 298  --  --  --  -- 59
Belgium  -- 300  -- 101  -- 75 136
Canada 121 204 214  -- 94  -- 96
Denmark  -- 235  -- 117  -- 87 69
Finland  -- 384  --  --  --  --  --
France 216 318 523 112 265 83 48
Germany  -- 348 457  -- 221  --  --
Greece  --  --  -- 245  -- 185 114
Ireland  -- 107  -- 78  -- 55 -
Italy 242 401 560 207 357 157 129
Japan 162 299 261  -- 166  -- 83
Luxembourg  --  --  -- 219  -- 156 -
Netherlands  -- 214  -- 144  -- 103 79
Portugal  -- 277  -- 128  -- 93 71
Spain  -- 323  -- 129  -- 93 63
Sweden  -- 370 291  -- 131  -- 92
United Kingdom 156 142 148 92 117 68 46
United States 113 163 206  -- 106  -- 69











A B A B A B A B
Argentina 24.6 29.1 16.8 11.0 10.7 8.4 97.1 75.7
Australia 8.8 10.2 12.1 9.1 5.1 4.8 8.5 8.1
Austria 56.8 76.4 25.0 20.5 20.1 18.4 60.7 55.6
Belgium 11.2 12.4 6.0 4.6 3.7 3.1 11.7 10.0
Brazil 23.8 26.2 21.3 17.9 12.4 11.7 78.9 74.0
Canada 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
Denmark 9.9 29.0 4.7 4.5 3.4 4.0 5.8 6.7
Finland 47.6 67.6 26.5 21.2 20.6 19.4 54.1 50.8
Germany 21.1 25.9 17.6 14.1 9.5 9.5 29.5 29.5
Ireland -2.1 -4.3 -2.5 -4.4 -1.1 -2.1 -2.5 -4.8
Italy 37.0 49.1 18.0 13.3 12.4 10.5 33.3 28.2
Japan 26.0 29.5 28.6 25.3 15.5 15.5 53.6 53.6
Netherlands 21.0 28.7 21.4 22.3 8.5 8.9 14.9 15.6
New Zealand -1.0 -1.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8
Norway 11.5 9.9 9.4 8.1 7.4 6.3 11.3 9.7
Portugal 7.6 9.8 9.6 7.5 4.2 4.2 13.3 13.3
Spain 50.6 62.2 22.5 17.0 17.4 14.5 53.9 44.9
Sweden 37.6 50.5 22.6 18.9 16.1 15.6 42.9 41.9
Thailand -38.1 -47.7 -185.1 -114.2 -25.0 -25.0 -81.7 -81.8
France 17.2 22.2 11.5 9.8 7.1 6.9 66.0 64.0
United
Kingdom
6.6 9.7 9.6 9.5 2.6 2.7 9.4 9.5
United States 18.7 27.0 19.8 20.3 10.5 10.8 23.8 24.4
Notes: Table entries are percentage adjustments needed to achieve generational balance.
A.  Education expenditure treated as government consumption.
B.  Education expenditure treated as government transfers and distributed by age groups.
na – not available
Source: Kotlikoff and Raffelhueschen (1999).21
Table A-4: Risk Diversification for Different Retirement Portfolios
National and International, Financial Market and Multi-pillar






  Wages 4.8 5.2 3.6 1.0
  Interest rates 3.9 3.8 1.9 2.3
 Capital return 10.1 10.8 10.8 9.8
Standard deviation
  Wages 3.4 6.1 3.0 2.4
  Interest rates 1.1 2.3 3.1 2.9
 Capital return 26.3 24.7 25.3 18.3
Correlation
  Wages and interest rate -0.086 0.238 0.194 -0.197
  Wages and capital return -0.077 0.186 -0.025 0.202
  Interest rate and capital return 0.070 0.085 -0.167 0.130
Table B: Correlation of financial market returns between
countries, 1953-95
Germany Japan UK USA
Germany 1.000 0.240 0.552 0.542
Japan 0.349 1.000 0.041 0.060
UK 0.473 0.153 1.000 0.617
USA 0.309 -0.084 0.225 1.000
(lower half: interest rates; upper half: capital
returns)
Table C:  Real rates of return, and their correlation at international level, 1953-95
(equal country share)
Interest rate Capital return Interest rate &
Capital return
Mean 3.0 10.4 6.7
Standard deviation 2.6 23.6 17.2
Correlation 0.11522




National portfolio with fixed shares*
  Mean 3.8 3.9 3.4 3.3
  Standard deviation 8.1 9.3 7.8 6.0
  Correlation (W&(I&C)) -0.08 0.21 0.00 0.04
International portfolio with fixed shares**
  Mean 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
  Standard deviation 5.4 6.8 5.9 5.8
  Correlation (W&(I&C)) -0.140 0.167 0.184 0.218
National optimal portfolio***
  Mean 5.1 8.5 4.9 4.9
  Standard deviation 6.6 17.0 7.2 6.3
International optimal portfolio****
  Mean 4.9 7.3 7.3 7.8
  Standard deviation 4.3 10.2 10.3 11.4
* 50 percent national wage, 50 percent national financial portfolio with equal shares
** 50 percent national wage, 50% international financial portfolio with equal shares
*** Maximizes mean to standard deviation of portfolio of wages and national financial market
**** Maximizes mean to standard deviation of portfolio of wages and international financial market
Source: Holzmann (2000)
Notes:  Tables A through D provide straightforward and simple estimates of the performance of
alternative retirement assets, and the risk/return trade-off under alternative portfolio structures.  The
basic data are annual returns on social security assets (proxied by real wage growth), fixed interest
assets (proxied by government bonds), and capital assets (proxied by returns of listed shares) in the 4
main industrialized countries.  Since the rates of return are measured in national currency, the estimates
abstract from the exchange rate risk.  On the other hand the (high) wage growth reflects the
development of the past with rising labor force participation and moderate aging.  The data is taken
from Thompson (1998) and covers the years 1953 to 1995.